INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 8

For week ending 28 February 1950

Volume III

The International Week

Most significant event of the week was the British election split between Labor and Conservatives which brought into question the present government's ability to pursue strong policies both at home and abroad. Meanwhile a revival of pessimism is apparent in Western Europe, as a result of recent Soviet successes, US slowness in implementing the Atlantic Pact, and the threat of new and more terrible atomic weapons.

Improved prospects for israeli-Jordan Non-Aggression Pact. Jordan and Israel's recent tentative agreement on a five year non-aggression pact greatly improves the prospects for normalization of the situation in Palestine. On 24 February Jordan and Israel initialed a text formulating principles suggested by King Abdullah (for details, see D/In Weekly 21 February 1950). Israeli Cabinet had previously agreed in principle to the King's proposal and the Jordan Cabinet has also reportedly accepted the document as a basis for formal talks. The memorandum also deals with the problem of Jerusalem, presently under consideration by the UN Trusteeship Council in Geneva, by providing for a joint Israeli-Jordan guarantee to the UN of access to and freedom of the Holy Places as well as for acceptance of international supervision of such sites. Jordan and Israel have not yet reached final agreement and there is plenty of room for argument over the somewhat vague and general provisions of the initialed memorandum. Moreover strong reaction from other Arab States is to be expected. Nevertheless a long step forward has been taken, thus improving prospects for normalizing the relations between the two states chiefly involved in the Palestinian territorial cuestion.

Stalemate on Eritrea. Progress towards Italo-Ethiopian rapprochement has been endangered by Ethiopia's negative reaction to a draft formula for settlement of differences over the disposition of Eritrea. This formula would provide that both parties desist from propaganda activities in the territory and from advocacy of particular proposals, while reserving the right to uphold their interests before the Commission if requested. Italy adopted a conciliatory attitude throughout the recent discussions and

NO CHI NGE IN CLUSS. [] □ DECLASS CLASS, CHANGED NEXT REVIEW DATE:

CONTIDE A DE MO 102 : CIA-RDR 79-040 90 A 000 1000 300 20-6 Approved FULLY

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/92 CHA-RDP79-01090A000100030020-6

is believed to have gone as far as it can with the draft, which also promised future negotiations of a more specific character. Italy has thus indicated its willingness, despite its own doubts as to the wisdom of this proposal, to establish friendly relations with Ethiopia, and the next step is up to the latter. The atmosphere in Addis Ababa is reportedly unfavorable to these overtures, but Ethiopia may yet be persuaded of the advantages in an agreement with Italy at this time.

Catholic trade unions still divided on new international. The decision of the Belgian Christian trade unions not to affiliate independently with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) but to recommend unified action by all Christian national unions reflects the continued division of Europe's Catholic trade unions on this issue. The Belgian and Dutch Catholic unions, together with the leadership of the Christian labor international (CISC), are shifting increasingly from neutrality to open opposition to the Brussels international, which they characterize as "not dynamic enough" and US-dominated. Belgian support for continuation of the Christian international is reportedly also influenced by CISC efforts to organize an independent Catholic labor movement in Germany, an objective which the Belgian Christian unions strongly favor.

Officials of the Christian labor international are currently attributing their opposition to ICFTU to: (a) doubt that European Socialist labor is willing to work with an international sponsoring a non-Socialist program, and (b) resentment over AFL "threats" against those failing to join. Actually, their opposition more likely stems from determination to keep the Christian international intact. CISC unity, however, can be maintained only if the Christian national trade unions adopt a common position. Such a position is apparently improbable at present since the Italian trade unions and leftwing French Christian unions still insist on joining the ICFTU. The CISC Bureau is therefore likely to postpone final action until the April CISC meeting and in the meantime will probably seek to avoid the defection of these two important groups by emphasizing its readiness to collaborate on a basis of equality with the Brussels international.

New Kashmir approach in SC. A US-UK-Cuban-Norwegian resolution calling on India and Pakistan to prepare and execute a program of demilitarization within five months and appointing a UN representative to assist in the preparation as well as supervise implementation of the program has been placed before the SC. It

THE PARTY OF THE P

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030020-6

responsibilities to a UN representative who is "to place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before those governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute." The proposed resolution thus opens the way to a solution other than plebiscite, although any such solution would depend on the agreement of both India and Pakistan. Although Pakistan Foreign Minister Zafrullan, has indicated that the resolution is acceptable, the Indian views are not yet known.

Chinese representation in iter. The conviction that within a few weeks a Chinese Communist representative might successfully be seated on the Executive Board of the International Children's Emergency Fund probably lies behind the cancellation of a recent Board meeting by its Polish chairman Ludwik Rajchman. (Eleven of the Board's twenty-six members have recognized the Chinese Communists and at least two or three more may do so soon or may abstain on a vote.) Aside from wishing to avoid a walkout of the Board's three Satellite members who with four other Eastern European countries have received the lion's share of ICEF allocations, Rajchman may be particularly anxious for a favorable vote on the Chinese Communists since their government stands to receive an allocation of \$7 million as soon as it is seated on the Board and can negotiate a satisfactory agreement. Under pressure from the US and other governments, Rajchman has now scheduled the Board meeting for 6 March

Chinese UN representation. Ecuador's UN representative believes it desirable to withdraw recognition from the Chinese Nationalists and seat the Communists in the SC without recognizing the Communist Government. A switch in Ecuador's position would leave the SC only one vote short of seating the Chinese Communists, assuming three factors: that the USSR returns to the chamber for the vote: that no state recognizing the Communists abstains, and that Na ionalist China does not invoke the veto in its own behalf.

Approved For Release 1990 100 EOA REP79-01090A000100030020-6

REVIVED SCEPTICISM AMONG NAT NATIONS

A succession of recent events seem to have revived latent scepticism among some of the NAT nations, notably France and Italy, as to the security value of the Atlantic Pact and the Military Aid Program. The occurrences which have brought West Europeans to reexamine the validity of their adherence to the Atlantic Pact and MDAP are: (1) Reported Soviet acquisition of the A-bomb several years ahead of previous estimates, thus ending the US monopoly; (2) US determination to make a hydrogen bomb; (3) The Fuchs spy case, which calls into question how far Anglo-American atomic security might have been compromised; (4) US political and press comment which could not fail to create some impression that even US self-confidence and nerves have, for the time being at least, been badly shaken; (5) Churchill's election call for a new direct approach to the Kremlin; (6) The Chinese debacle with its patent effect on the world power balance and its possible influence in shifting US exertions from Europe to the Far Fast; and (7) Some renewed European fears that the US is not firmly committed to all-out support of Western Europe and may yet relapse into neo-isolationism.

When the Atlantic Part was signed in April 1949, it was commonly believed that the US enjoyed a commanding lead over the Soviet Union in its exclusive possession of the A-bomb and that this superiority was both sufficient to counterbalance Soviet superiority in conventional armamen's and enduring enough to afford ample opportunity to restore Western European power before the USSR could approach atomic parity with the US.

Today, however, most Europeans are aware in differing degrees of an acceleration in the growth of Soviet war potential and a concommitant urgency in filling the post war power vacuum in Western Europe. At the same time they see little concrete evidence of comparable increase in Western military strength. On the continent the effect has been to make more vocal those elements which all along have favored "neutrality" and the creation of a European "third force." Prevailing opinion, however, particularly among government of icials, recognizes the essential unrealism of the "neutrality" concept and can see no practical alternative to a political and military link to the US short of accepting the status of a Soviet satellite. Nevertheless, even those who maintain cool heads probably are less confident of US ability to contain the USSR than they were one year ago.

In large part the present revival of defeatist tendencies in Europe is the result of the inevitable lag between the signing of the Atlantic Pact and the appearance of concrete evidences of

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 ; CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030020-6

increased strength in the West, and will thus tend to disappear as US arms begin to flow and the AP nations themselves begin to show increased defensive capabilities. It also reflects, however, the deep-seated psychological indecision which is Western Europe's heritage from two world wars and which undermines European will to resist. Many Europeans particularly the French traditionally long for a security which would either remove all danger of aggression or at least guarantee that any invasion attempt be repelled at the frontier. The desire for such "absolute security" will continue to be a major psychological factor in European uneasiness until such time as economic recovery, continued US aid, and the development of common institutions have restored European confidence in their ability to survive. In this connection only tangible evidences of US determination such as an expanded and accelerated MDAP and continued economic aid will bring any substantial reassurance to Europe.